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Olaya: Public Employees' First Amendment Speech Rights in the Social Med

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS IN THE
SOCIAL MEDIA WORLD:

#FIRE OR #FIRE-D?
I. INTRODUCTION

Today, it is supposedly well established that public employees do not forfeit their constitutional rights at work.1 Certain restraints on their speech, however, have been deemed acceptable. 2
After all, it was once established that "[a policeman] may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman. ' ' 3 When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
stated this in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, this was in fact

the norm in most employer-employee relationships in the public
sector.4 Almost a century after McAuliffe, however, the United
States Supreme Court rejected Justice Holmes' view and recognized that government employees, also known as public employees, were entitled to freedom of speech. 5 After the seminal Pickering v. Board of Education decision, which established that

public employees do not entirely relinquish their free speech rights
simply because they decide to work in the public sector, 6 two
courts added additional requirements that need to be satisfied before a public employee can claim any rights to free-speech.7
These requirements, however, namely the private citizen and pub' Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th
Cir. 2011).
2

id.

3Connick

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (quoting McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)).
4 See McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
' See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569, 574 (1968).
6 See id.
7 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-(2006); Connick, 461 U.S. at
148, 150, 154.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

1

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:2

lic concern requirement, significantly narrowed the rights of pub-

lic employees in such a magnitude that it remains questionable
whether Justice Holmes' statement in McAuliffe actually remains
true. s As a consequence of such a narrow interpretation, a myriad
struggled with interpreting public employees'
of courts have since
9
free speech rights.

The birth of social media has raised additional issues within
the employer-employee relationship in the public sector. Social
media platforms allow people to express their thoughts, beliefs,
and concerns through various mediums. 10 For example, some of
the ways that people can express themselves through social media
are by "tweeting" on Twitter, uploading a video to YouTube, post-

ing a picture on Instagram, sharing a post on Facebook, and even
"liking" a Facebook post. 1 Interpreting the various statements
on these social media platforms, however, is not an easy
expressed
12
task.

The transformation caused by social media has not only
made it difficult for courts to determine whether or not certain ac-

tions on social media can be considered speech entitled to First
Amendment protections. The transformation has also increasingly

blurred the line when making this determination when a 1public
3
"speech.
employee is involved in the contested social media

8 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419;-Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49; McAuliffe, 29
N.E. at 517-18.
9 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994); see also Liverman
v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Hemminghaus
v. Missouri, 756 F.3d 1100, 1111 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Garcia v. Hartford
Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2013) (showing that the requirements
established by the courts to define the free speech rights of public employees in
the workplace remains unclear). See Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App'x
817 (1lth Cir. 2013).
10Noel Diem, Freedom of Speech and Social Media, LAW STREET (Dec.
10, 2014), https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/freedom-ofspeech-social-media/.
11E.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013).
12 See Diem, supra note 10.
13 See, e.g., Bland, 730 F.3d at 385-86; see also Mark Schroeder, Keeping
the "Free"in Teacher Speech Rights: ProtectingTeachers and their Use of Social Media to Communicate with Students Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, 19
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25-26 (2013) (stating that the Pickeringcase did predate
social media).
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Freedom of speech is a fundamental right for several reasons. 14 It
promotes democracy and protects us against tyranny by allowing
us to express our thoughts, ideas and disagreements.15 Justice
Holmes, in a powerful dissent, stated "the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."' 16 This "marketplace of ideas" rationale, arguably, is at the
17
core of what makes freedom of speech such a fundamental right.
Yet, courts have in effect hindered the free "marketplace of ideas"
theory. 18
The difficulty here is understanding why courts have limited this right when the First Amendment unequivocally states that
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging ...the freedom of
speech... .,19 If it is true that "one of the most powerful restraints
on individual freedom is the power of employers to discharge
workers," 2° and if the intent behind the decision in Pickering was
to protect the individual freedoms of public employees, 21 why are
their rights in essence, so restricted?
Without even considering the type of speech that the First
Amendment does not protect, something that it does protect, is
symbolic speech.22 Although the framers of the Constitution could
never have imagined how outstretched the meaning of symbolic
speech would become, courts nevertheless have had to reconsider
Steven Pinker, Opinion, Why free speech is fundamental,BOSTON
GLOBE (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:37 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/26/why-free-speechfundamental/aaAWVYFscrhFCC4ye9FVjN/story.html.
15 See id.
16Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
17 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace
of Ideas, 2004 SUP.
CT. REv. 1, 2 (2004).
18 See Richard Renner, Retaliation-Public Employees and First
Amendment Rights, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefaimess.org/retaliation-public-employees (last visited
May 14, 2019).
19 U.S CONST. amend. I.
20 Renner, supra note 18.
21See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74
(1968).
22 See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931).
14
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23
its meaning in light of such a technologically inclined era. For
example, the Fourth Circuit has held that certain actions on social
media such as "liking" a Facebook post, constitute protected
speech in the public sector.2 4 However, it remains unclear if other
actions on social media are protected.25 Perhaps, this is because
technology has been changing at such a rapid pace, that courts are
unable to keep up. 26 As the Supreme Court recently stated,

While we now may be coming to the realization
that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.
The forces and directions of the Internet are so new,
so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be
conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.27
This note addresses two conflicting issues: protecting the
rights of public employees and promoting efficiency in the workplace. 28 Specifically, this note will address the difficult issue of
determining whether a public employee's social media speech is
protected and the current framework's infringement on the First
Amendment, with special emphasis on the Pickering balancing
"potential disruption standard" seemingly adopted by
test and the
29
courts.
the
Although, some may argue that it is easy to interpret the
current legal framework, others argue it is a challenging task, beSee Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016);
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384-85 (4th Cir. 2013); Gresham v. City of AtF. App'x 817, 818 (1 lth Cir. 2013).
lanta, 542
24
Bland, 730 F.3d at 384-86.
25 See infra Sections LV.C., V.A.
26 Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can'tKeep Pace with Technology,
23

MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014),
52 64
0 1/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pacehttps://www.technologyreview.com/s/
with-technology/.
27 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
28 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
29 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983).
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cause although speech through social media has become increas3
ingly common, it has not been fully explored by the courts. 0
Thus, this note argues that unless a different test is implemented,
in light of the pervasive and exponential growth of technology and
social media use, courts will inevitably encounter the very issue
they were trying to avoid: opening the floodgates to an unprecedented number of public employees questioning the constitutionality of an adverse employment action. Part II of this note focuses
on public employees and when their speech is protected.32 Part III
of this note discusses the evolution of social media and its effects
on the First Amendment for public employees.33 Part IV of this
note focuses on how the public concern requirement has been ex34
amined in the context of social media and its legal implications.
Part V discusses the use of emoji's by public employees and the
issues applying the current framework in this context. 35 Lastly,
part VI makes two suggestions on how to restructure the current
framework in light of new forms of expression that have recently
emerged.36
II. ASSERTING FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH CLAIMS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENT AND ITS
APPLICATION

Unlike employees in the private sector, public employees
are protected from experiencing adverse employment actions after
exercising their right to freedom of speech. 3 In other words,
when public employees engage in speech, including symbolic
speech (such as posting on social media), the employer cannot retaliate against the employee with negative employment actions
Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016);
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384-86 (4th Cir. 2013); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App'x 817, 818 (11th Cir. 2013).
31 Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
32 See infra Sections II.A., II.B.,
II.C.
33 See infra Sections III.A., I.B., llI.C.
30

34
35
36
37

See infra Sections IV.A., LV.B., IV. C.

See infra Sections V.A., V.B.
See infra Part VI.
See Renner, supra note 18.
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like firing or demoting them. 38 This right, however, is not absolute. 39 Public employees are only protected when they are speakconcern.", 40
ing as "private citizens" regarding matters of "public
Even if those two requirements are met, however, the courts must
still use a balancing test to determine whether the public employees' interest in free speech outweighs any potentially detrimental
effect on its employer.41
A. The Short-Lived Speech Protectionsfor Public
Employees
Prior to 1968, public employees did not have free speech
rights at all. 42 The seminal Supreme Court case, Pickering v.
BoardofEd., however, changed this arbitrary rule.43 The Court in
Pickering held that public employees did not simply forfeit their
rights to freedom of speech just because they work for the government.44 Instead, the Court established a balancing test, that is
still applied today, in order to "arrive at a balance between the interests of the . . . [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an emof the public services it perployer, in promoting the efficiency
45
employees."
its
forms through
In other words, in order for a public employee to sue their
employer, they need to convince the court that their interest, as a
citizen in speaking about a matter of public concern, outweighs the
government employers' interest in operating an efficient workplace. 46 Essentially then, courts are faced with the task of deterSee Renner, supra note 18.
'9 See id.
40 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415-17 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 154 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968).
41 See Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.
42 See Renner, supra note 18; see also Pickering,391 U.S. at 567, 574;
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
43 See Pickering,391 U.S. at 574.
38

44
See id.
45
1Id. at 568.
46

See id.
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mining what speech is deemed "worthy of public attention. ' ' 7
Perhaps because the balancing test established in Pickering was
stated very broadly, the Court established three factors to consider
in striking the balance.48 The Pickering test, however, remained a
broad framework to examine public employees' free speech
rights. 49 Although after the Pickeringdecision several courts tried
to clarify the balancing test,50 this broad approach essentially remained the same until 1983.51
B. The Beginning of the Downward Slope
The apparent victory for public employees' free speech
rights was short lived. It was not until the decision in Connick v.
Meyers that the Court, by squarely confronting the question of the
"public concern" requirement broadly mentioned in Pickering,
significantly narrowed its interpretation. 52 In Connick, district attorney Harry Connick Sr. fired an assistant district attorney after
she refused to accept an office transfer and instead, distributed a
questionnaire at work to other assistant district attorneys "concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." 53 The
Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler: FirstAmendment in
the Workplace, 15 INSIGHTs L. & Soc'Y 12, 14 (2015).
41 See Pickering,391 U.S. at 569-71 (establishing the factors
as (1) the
parties' working relationship, (2) the detrimental effect of the speech on the
employer, and (3) the nature of the issue upon which the employee spoke and
the relationship of the employee to that issue).
41 See id. at 568 (finding that public employees did enjoy speech protections if the speech passed the balancing test the Court articulated, however, the
Court did not explain the balancing test any further or give examples of when it
would apply).
50 See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-17
(1979); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 28487 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
51 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47
(1983).
52 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (finding that although
the balancing
test established in Pickeringstill applied, a preliminary question of whether or
not the public employees' speech was considered a matter of public concern,
first needed
to be answered).
53
47

1Id. at 140-41.
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District Court found that Myers' questionnaire involved "matters
of public concern" and ruled in favor of Myers.54
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court disagreed.55 The
Court held that the District Court, by holding that the questionnaire involved matters of public concern, "got off on the wrong
foot in this case." 56 Instead, the Court held that "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record., 57 After using this new standard to
determine whether an employee's statement is considered protected speech, the Court held that Myers' questionnaire was "most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy" and thus, did not address a matter of public
concern. 58 As such, the Court found that Myers' termination was
59
not unconstitutional and did not violate the First Amendment.
Thus, the threshold to satisfy a "public concern" is limited.6 °
Connick established what is now known as the PickeringConnick balancing test. 61 This two-pronged test requires courts to
first determine if the public employees' speech is related to a matter of public concern by examining the "content, form, and context" of the statement made. 62 If the court determines that the
statement is a matter of public concern, then the actual balancing
test is applied: does the employee's interest in his First Amendment right outweigh the employer's interest in maintaining an efficient workplace, especially as a state employer? 63 In taking

54
55
56

57

See id. at 142.
See id. at 154.
Id. at 143.

Id. at 147-48.
See id. at 154.
'9 See id.
58

60 id.
61

See David L. Hudson Jr., Public Employees, PrivateSpeech: 1st

Amendment doesn 't always protectgovernment workers, ABA JOURNAL (May

1, 2017,4:10 AM),
http://www.abaj oumal.com/magazine/article/public-employees-private-speech.
62 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
63 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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these two conflicting interests into account, courts consider not
64
just the speech in question but also the circumstances as a whole.
Notably, the Court in Connick gave the employer significant
latitude when balancing the interests at stake. 65 In articulating the
"wide degree of deference" an employer has in the balancing
process, and in its continued attempt to narrow the employee's
First Amendment rights, the Court also determined the low
threshold standard of disruption to the workplace that an employer
needs to show. 66
Accordingly, the Court found that the
employee's First Amendment rights were not violated and
emphasized that an employer was not required to tolerate behavior
and actions that he reasonably believed would disrupt the office,
would undermine his authority, and negatively affect close
working relationships. 67
The dissent, however, rightfully
challenged the disruption standard established by the majority as
an incorrect application of Pickering and emphasized the danger
the standard poses of inhibiting speech.6 s

64Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th
Cir. 2006).
For Pickeringbalancing, "we must take into account the context of the employee's speech" and "the extent to which it disrupts the operation and mission" of the institution. Factors
relevant to this inquiry include whether a public employee's
speech (1) impaired the maintenance of discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among coworkers; (3) damaged
close personal relationships; (4) impeded the performance of
the public employee's duties; (5) interfered with the operation
of the institution; (6) undermined the mission of the institution; (7) was communicated to the public or to coworkers in
private; (8) conflicted with the responsibilities of the employee within the institution; and (9) abused the authority and public accountability that the employee's role entailed.
Id.
65 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
6Id. at 152 ("[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow
events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction
relationships is manifest before taking action.").
of working
67
1d. at 151-54.
68 See id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "such extreme deference" will prevent public employees from speaking out on critical matters).
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C. Another Loss for Public Employees
As if at this point, the speech rights of public employees

were not already significantly narrowed, public employees lost in
another Supreme Court case decided approximately two decades
after Connick.6 9 The Court determined that public employees are
protected under the First Amendment when they not only pass the
public concern test, but also when they establish that their
statement was made as a private citizen rather than pursuant to
their "official duties., 70 In other words, a public employee must
prove that the speech in question was not made "because that
[was] part of what he ...was employed to do" but rather, because
he or she was speaking as an ordinary citizen. 7 1 The result
significantly narrowed constitutional protections instead of
creating an open invitation for public employees to voice their
concerns. 72 Instead of protecting public employees, the Court in
73
Garcetti v. Ceballos effectively created unnecessary confusion.
Rather than providing a rule for lower courts to follow, the
Supreme Court recognized that its ultimate holding in Garcetti
was not dispositive and that in some cases, public employees
could "receive First Amendment protection for expressions made
at work."

69

74

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the

Constitution does not protect public employees from retaliation when they are
"not speaking as citizens" but rather, speaking "pursuant to their official duties").
70 See id. at 410-11 (noting that the possibility of a First Amendment
claim arising depends on whether or not the public employee "spoke as a citizen
on a matter of public concern" and whether the public employee's statement
was made
during the "course of official business").
71
Seeid. at 411.
72 Id. at 421-22 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.").
73 See id. at 420-21 (noting the Court's reluctance to create a bright line
rule establishing that all work-related speech was excluded from First Amendment protection).
74 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 ("Many citizens do much of their talking inside their respective workplaces, and it would not serve the goal of treating pub-

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol36/iss2/6

10

Olaya: Public Employees' First Amendment Speech Rights in the Social Med
20191

#FIRE OR #FIRE-D?

Recently, in Lane v. Franks, although the Court did not delineate the scope of Garcetti's "official duties" standard, it did
make an important point. The Court expressed that, "speech by
public employees on subject matter related to their employment
holds special value precisely because those employees gain
knowledge of matters of public concern through their
employment., 75 Therefore, "it is essential that [public employees]
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
retaliatory dismissal., 76 The Court's message in Lane, however,
seems to have fallen on deaf ears because four months after Lane,
a federal district court in West Virginia broadly interpreted
Garcetti and ruled against an employee in a First Amendment
speech right
case dealing specifically with intemet-based
77
expression.

In Austin v. Preston County, the plaintiff-employee was the
director of the Preston County Animal Shelter and administrated
the shelter's Facebook page through her own personal account; the
plaintiff-employee was disciplined, twice, for what she posted on
the shelter's Facebook page. 78 Notably, the plaintiff-employee's
job duty did not include maintaining a Facebook page for the
shelter. 9 Eventually, after deleting the Facebook page, the
plaintiff-employee
was
terminated
by
the
shelter's
80
commissioners.
The District Court, in responding to the
plaintiff-employee's challenge of her First Amendment rights,
broadly interpreted Garcetti and concluded that even if the
plaintiffs job duty did not include maintaining the shelter's
Facebook page, she nonetheless acted "pursuant to her job duties"
lic employees [like members of the public] ... to hold that all speech within the

office is automatically exposed to restriction.").
" See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2373, 2379 (2014).
76 See id. at 2379.
77 See Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm'n, No. 1:13CV135, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS78146041 *2-5 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014).

Id.at *2-8 (noting that the first disciplinary warning occurred after a
celebratory Facebook post stated that the shelter had gone sixty days without
euthanizing an animal and encouraged its viewers to comment or like the post to
spread the word, and the second discipline was related to another Facebook
post, this
time, about the shelter's lack of heat and water).
79
Id. at *17.
'0Id.at *8.
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since "she assumed that task voluntarily when she asked . . for
permission to open the Facebook page." 81 Thus, the Court
essentially ignored the message from Lane when the Court
the First Amendment did not protect the plaintiff in
decided that
82
this case.
In sum, after Garcetti, the courts regressed and left public
employee's vulnerable to retaliation. 83 For example, "even if the
speech blows the whistle on alarming governmental corruption", if
the statement is made as part of the employee's job duty then the
employee will not likely have a constitutional claim.84 Courts are
willing to throw away a public employee's speech rights even in
instances where a public employee is simply trying to benefit its
employer and protect the integrity of the workplace. 85 As a result,
Garcetti not only fails to protect government employers but also
fails to protect the general public by undermining the importance
of a public employee's ability to inform citizens of important
issues within 86their government job and alert the public to danger
or corruption.
D. InterpretingFactualDisagreements
In 1994, the Supreme Court built upon the disruption standard articulated in Connick after a public employee was terminated87
facts.
based on the employer's incorrect understanding of the

" Id. at *16-17.
82 Austin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146041, at *18-19 ("[S]he used the
postings to interest the public... and to gain support when the Shelter encountered problems ....[S]he spoke out in a manner that undermined administration
of the shelter ....[T]herefore [she] was not entitled to the protections of the
FirstAmendment.").
83 See Hudson Jr., supra note
61.
84
id.

85
86

See id.
See Paul M. Secunda, The Most ImportantPublic Employment Law

Case: Pickeringv. Board ofEducation, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), MARQ. UNIV. L.
ScH. FACuLTY BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010),

https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/10/25/the-most-important-publicemployment-law-case-pickering-v-board-of-education-391 -u-s-563-1968/.
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The question in Waters v. Churchill was whether the Connick test
could be applied to the government employer's mistaken version
of the facts or if a jury should determine what the actual facts
were. 88 The Court's opinion reiterated the premise established in
Connick that a public employer has wide discretion to restrict its
employees' speech. 89 Ultimately, the Court imposed on public
employers a low threshold responsibility: a duty of reasonable investigation to ensure that the termination is based on the "facts as
90
the employer reasonablyfound them to be."
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion attacked the plurality
decision due to its unwarranted expansion of the liability
standard. 91 In other words, Justice Scalia importantly noted that
the plurality decision essentially "converted the government
employer's First Amendment liability . . . from liability for

intentional wrong to liability for mere negligence." 92 Due to the
importance of protecting civil liberties, Justice Scalia also noted
that "[j]udicial inquiry" rather than an employer's fact finding
investigation, should be the correct approach. 93 In justifying the
See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664 (1994). In Waters, Churchill, the plaintiff-employee, worked as a nurse at a government hospital and was
terminated after a conversation with a fellow nurse, where Churchill allegedly
complained of the conditions in her department, was reported to Churchill's supervisor. Id. at 664-65. According to Waters' understanding of the facts underlying the conversation, the matter Churchill was complaining about was not a
matter of public concern and thus, was not protected under First Amendment
jurisprudence. Id. Churchill's version of the conversation, however, was different and under her version, the conversation was regarding a matter of public
concern. Id. at 666.
88 Id. at 668.
87

89

Id. at 671-72.

90 Id. at 677.
91 Id. at 688-89 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92 id.

93

Id. at 689-90 ("Judicial inquiry into the genuineness of a public employer's asserted permissible justification for an employment decision-be it unprotected speech, general insubordination, or laziness-is all that is necessary to
avoid the targeting of 'public interest' speech condemned in Pickering."). The
author of this Note recognizes that Scalia's mention of a "judicial inquiry" was
that of a pretext judicial inquiry. See id. at 690. However, due to the difficulty
in ascertaining the meaning and intent behind modem day speech and the impending threat of infringing on public employees' speech rights, a general judicial inquiry approach is necessary to evaluate the inevitable issues of fact that
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"[j]udicial inquiry" standard, Justice Scalia noted that previous
Supreme Court cases supported his position. 94 As set forth below,
the expansion of the liability standard, poses a serious threat to
public employees' First Amendment rights in light of the
evolution of intemet-based expression and the unavoidable
difficulty in deciphering the intended meaning behind modem day
forms of speech.
III. INCORPORATING RIGHTS IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA WORLD
Social media's impact has globally transformed the way
people think, discover, communicate, and share content. 96 Its
"increasingly prevalent use ... [however,] has created an ongoing
tension between an employee's right to free speech and the
employer's right to manage employees and operate the
business." 97 Yet, its relatively recent explosion and constant
evolution has both employers and employees digging for answers
to legal
questions that courts have not yet anticipated nor decid98
ed.
arise in the context of social media speech. See infra Sections V.A., V.B.; see
also Waters, 511 U.S. at 690 (noting that a public employee has a "right not to
be fired for his speech" that must be protected).
94 Waters, 511 U.S. at 690 (noting the existence of "arguably weaker"
cases such as Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). In Mt. Healthy, a public employer asserted a mixed-motive for its adverse employment action and the Court decided that the District Court should
"determine whether the [public employer] had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the employee's]
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct." Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S. at 287.
95 See infra Sections V.A., V.B.
96 See Heather A. Morgan & Felicia A. Davis, Social Media and Employment Law Summary of Key Cases and Legal Issues, PAUL HASTINGS LLP 1
(Mar.
2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/laborlaw/2013/04
/abanationalsymposiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/10_socialmedia.
authcheckdam.pdf.
97 Ute Krudewagen & Lisa Stam, Global Employee Terminations In The
Age OfSocial Media, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2011, 3:22 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/267702?scroll = l.
98 See Morgan & Davis, supra note 96.
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Social media allows members to create online profiles and
become connected with family, friends, and strangers with
common interests.
Some popular social media sites are
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube. 100 For the
most part, each site has its own unique features that sets it apart
from other social media sites. 10 1 For example, Facebook sets itself
apart with its "Facebook status" feature which allows users to,
among other things, express their thoughts, share a picture or
video, record a live video, express their current feelings and
publicize their whereabouts. 0 2 Additionally, Facebook has the
"like" feature which allows users to easily let other Facebook
friends and users know that they like or dislike something without
having to post a comment.10 3 Twitter allows its users to share
various posts known as "tweets," but, the site has a shorter word
10 4
count for its posts.
LinkedIn, in certain ways, is similar to Facebook.10 5 For example,
Linkedln also allows its users to post articles, photos, videos, or
other ideas.' ° 6 However, it is aimed at providing professionals
with the ability to network, market themselves or their business,
and search for jobs.10 7 Perhaps the most different social media
platform, in comparison to those previously mentioned, is
9'See id. at 3.
100See

Christina Jaremus, #Firedforfacebook."The Casefor Greater
ManagementDiscretion in Discipline or Dischargefor Social Media Activity,
42 RUTGERS L. REc. 1, 2 (2014-15); Gregory A. Hearing & Brian C.
Ussery, The Times They Are A Changin': The Impact of Technology and Social
Media on the Public Workplace, Part I, 86 FLA. B.J. 35, 35 (2012).
10' See Jaremus, supra note 100, at 1-2.
102 See id. at 1; see Hearing & Ussery, supra note 100, at 35.
103 See Jaremus, supra note 100, at 1.
104 See Hearing & Ussery, supra note 100, at 35.
105 See Josh Bersin, Facebook vs. Linkedln - What's the Difference?
FORBES
(May
21,
2012,
8:58
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/j oshbersin/2012/05/21/facebook-vs-linkedinwhats-the-difference/# 1baad7b56af5.
106 See generally Dennis Koutoudis, Is Linkedin Becoming More Like Facebook? LINKEDSUPERPOWERS BLOG (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://linkedsuperpowers.com/post/linkedin-becoming-more-facebook (explaining that LinkedLn does share similarities with Facebook, such as providing
"a very powerful posting platform and so much more").
107 See Hearing & Ussery, supra note 100, at 35.
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Instagram because users are primarily focused on posting pictures. 1 8 Lastly, YouTube, is a video-sharing website that allows
users to upload, share, and view a plethora of videos on almost any
topic of choice. 10 9 There are, of course, several other social media
websites not mentioned herein. 110 One unifying concept, however,
is that "social media users employ these websites to engage in a
wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics 'as diverse as human thought."" 1 '
Social media has become an electronic "digital marketplace
of ideas"' 12 that virtually provides transmission of ideas and
information. 1 3 It's influence? Well, it really is no secret; the
internet, including social media, allows for an efficient form of
communication and unprecedented access to information." 4
Recognizing the internet's "extraordinary growth," the Supreme
Court has realized that people who have access to the internet can
methods of communication, which are
take advantage of several
115
evolving.
constantly
The current First Amendment framework used to determine
the speech rights of public employees is further complicated by the
unique aspects of social media and its intersection with today's
workplace.116 As a result, courts have struggled to determine what
108

See Jayson DeMers, Why InstagramIs The Top Social Platform For

Engagement (And How To Use 1t), FORBES (Mar. 28, 2017, 3:23 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/j aysondemers/2017/03/28/why-instagram-is-thetop-social-platform-for-engagement-and-how-to-use-it/# 144c76c336bd.
'09 See Hearing & Ussery, supra note 100, at 35.
110 See generally Randy Milanovic, The World's 21 Most ImportantSocial Media Sites and Apps in 2015, SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Apr. 13, 2015),

http://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/2015-04-13/worlds-21most-important-social-media-sites-and-apps-2015 (listing several different social media platforms that also allow people to connect and network with one
another).
111
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017).
112 See Benjamin Good, Google and Twitter Speak Up in Support of the
FirstAmendment Rights of Their Users, ACLU (Jan. 20, 2016, 2:45 PM),

https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/intemet-speech/google-and-twitterspeak-support-first-amendment-rights-their-users.
113 See Hearing & Ussery, supra note 100, at 35.
114

See id.

115

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
See Morgan & Davis, supra note 96, at 1.

116
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social media activity should be considered speech under the First
Amendment." 7 Perhaps more of a struggle, is making this
determination in the context of public employees because of the
already narrow and, arguably, troubling inquiry." 8
Social media is not going anywhere anytime soon. 119 For
this reason, a proposal for a new framework that appropriately
analyzes public employees' speech rights is crucial and will be
discussed in greater length later in this note. 120 If the current
inquiry remains despite the relatively new and constantly evolving
social media era, First Amendment rights will continue to be
narrowly interpreted, and perhaps again, entirely unrecognized in
the public sector, effectively regressing the country to the
1800,S.121

A. Balancing Test Problems in a DigitalEra
In 1997 through Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court decided
for the first time that speech on the internet is equally entitled to
First Amendment protections. 122 In Reno, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court, that the federal Communica-

117

See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).

118

Jessica 0. Laurin, "To Hell in A Handbasket": Teachers, FreeSpeech,

and Matters of Public Concern in the Social Media World, 92 IND. L.J. 1615,
1617-18 (2017) (explaining that due to the potential problems social media
speech can cause a public employee, social media speech that has First
Amendment value is often chilled and at the very minimum, has created a general fear of using social media which has prevented public employees from expressing their concerns about important topics online); see also Stephen
Allred, Connick v. Myers: Narrowingthe Free Speech Right of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 432 (1984) (agreeing with the dissent in Connick
v. Meyers that the majority "impermissively narrowed the subjects on which a
public employee may speak without fear of retaliatory dismissal").
119 See Michael T. Landen, Don'tPost, Pin Or Push Your Luck On Social
Media, LAw360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:09 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/590334?scroll=
1.
120
See infra Part IV.
121 See infra Part IV.
122 Internet Speech, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/freespeech/intemet-speech (last visited May 14, 2019).
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(CDA) was an unconstitutional restriction on
tions Decency Act
12 3
free speech rights.
The Court in Reno, admitted that although they have on
several occasions recognized the government's interest in protecting children from "harmful materials... that interest does not jus-

tify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults." 124 In fact, the Court found that it was unacceptable for the
government to "reduc[e] the adult population ... to... only what
is fit for children." 12 5 Since the Court previously determined in
Reno that while the government has an interest in protecting children from explicit content, "that interest does not justify" such an
unnecessary restriction of speech, 126 why do courts refuse to recognize the need for a similar relaxation of the perceived government interest in the context of the public workplace sector?
While a government employer has an interest in maintaining a smooth and efficient workplace, 127 that interest does not justify such a significant narrowing and suppression of First Amendment speech protections.1 2 8 After all, as stated in Reno,

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) (stating "[T]he CDA
places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech.... [It] threatens to
torch a large segment of the internet community.").
123

124

125

Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.

1d. at 888 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
l2 6Id at 875.
127Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Govern2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2010).
ment Employees,
128See id. at 2165 ("[O]ff duty expressive activities can have broader societal impact by resulting in a significant chilling effect on the speech of a huge
number of citizens and on the marketplace of ideas generally."); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J.
943, 943 (1987) ("[S]ome policy will be promoted at the expense of some other.
... That some.., process must be a part of any practical legal system is undeniable. ... [T]hat should not blind us to the extreme danger of too facile a use
of "balancing" in a system of justice."). The author of this note recognizes that
the Court's focus in Reno was on speech restrictions intended to protect children who are considered vulnerable and in need of protection. However, public
employees, in the employer-employee relationship, should also be analogized as
vulnerable since, without constitutional protection, public employers can retaliate against their employees for making statements that warrant constitutional
protection.
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[T]he record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of
ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit
129
of censorship.
Thus, while it is understandable that the government sometimes has an interest in restricting its employees' speech to execute
its services in an efficient manner, 13 the employee equally, if not
to a greater extent, has his own interests that too often receive
minimal protection because of the problems associated with the
13 1
balancing test that courts apply.
B. Is the FirstAmendment Keeping Up with the
Digital World?
Of course, the framers of the Constitution likely never imagined that computers and social media would one day exist.1 32
12 9

Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
Eugene Volokh, Narrow (but unanimous) Supreme Courtdecision

13 0

supportinggovernment employee speech rights, THE WASHINGTON POST (June

19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/19/narrow-but-unanimous-supreme-court-decisionsupporting-government-employee-speech-rights/?utmterm=.6e6aafl 2f4d4.
131See Papandrea, supra note 127, at 2120.
132 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 434
(2d Cir. 2001).
When the Framers of the First Amendment prohibited Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of
speech," they were not thinking about computers, computer
programs, or the Internet.... Just as the inventions at the beginning and middle of the 2 0 th century presented new First
Amendment issues, so does the cyber revolution at the end of
that century.
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However, the analysis the Supreme Court has used in other First
Amendment cases should not remain silenced in cases relating to
the rights of public employees in the workplace. For example, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court recognized the importance of the First Amendment's "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. 133
One of the most recent, if not the most recent, Supreme
Court decision relating to free speech rights was decided in June
2017.134 In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court
recognized internet and social media as essential forums where cit135 After all, the
izens can exercise their First Amendment rights.
Supreme Court in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, eloquently reiterated the importance of First Amendment protections
1 36
While recogregardless of recent technological advancements.
nizing that some exceptions apply, the Court nonetheless stated:
[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, "the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the
First Amendment's command, do not vary" when a
new and different medium for communication appears. The most basic of those principles is this:
"[A]s a general matter, . . . government has no
power to restrict expression because of its1message,
37
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017)
(finding that states could not broadly limit access to social media because foreclosing such access prevents "the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise
of First Amendment rights").
135 See id. at 1736 (noting that because this was one of the first cases regarding the First Amendment and the modem intemet, the Court had to tip-toe
around First Amendment interpretation because the "First Amendment provides
scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium").
136 See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790-91 (2011).
137 Id. (first quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503
(1952); then quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
133

134
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Of significance for our purposes, the Court recognized that while
free speech protections exist primarily to protect speech on public
matters, "it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment,
and dangerous to try. 'Everyone is familiar with instances of
propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine."' 138 Perhaps courts have struggled
with interpreting what constitutes a matter of "public concern,"
because of the Courts' paradoxical recognition of free speech: the
danger in distinguishing politics from entertainment and the view
of First Amendment protection being at its "zenith" when dealing
with matters of political speech. 139 Nonetheless, courts have recognized
that
making
a
statement
"in a public manner through the internet ... further weighs in fa' 140
vor of the conclusion that the speech [] is of public concern."
C. Thumbs Up or Thumbs Down for the FirstAmendment?
In Bland v. Roberts, six employees of the sheriff's office
were not reappointed by the Sherriff after the employees supported
the Sheriffs re-election rival on social media, by "liking" the Facebook page of the rival. 141 The lower court agreed with the Sherriff's argument that terminating the employees for "liking" a political candidates page on Facebook was not wrongful because it did
not constitute First Amendment activity. 14 2
In 2013, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
43
gave the First Amendment and public employees a thumbs up.
138

Brown, 564 U.S. at 790 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,

510 (1948)).
139

CompareBrown, 564 U.S. at 790 (recognizing the difficulty and dan-

ger involved in distinguishing politics from entertainment when determining
whether the speech should be deemed protected), with Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414, 425 (1988) (finding First Amendment protections to be at their "zenith"
when core political speech is involved).
141

Beyer v. Borough, 428 F. App'x 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2011).
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384 (4th Cir. 2013).

142

See id. at 386.

140

See id. at 378 (finding that there is no constitutional significance between a Facebook user typing a message "with several individual key strokes"
and using "a single mouse click to produce that message").
141
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On appeal, the Court found that "liking" the campaign Facebook
page of the Sherriffs election rival, was not only "pure speech, it
also was symbolic expression" because it nonetheless conveyed
144
the same message: support for the Sherriffs rivals' candidacy.
In other words, just as if the employees had posted a political sign
on their front yard would have conveyed the message to those
driving past their homes that they supported the campaign of his
Sherriffs election rival, "liking" a political Facebook page conviewed the employees' Faveyed the same message to those who
145
page.
campaign
the
or
page
cebook
In sum, while the court in Bland reversed the District
Court's holding and decided that "liking" a political candidate's
Facebook page constitutes protected First Amendment activity,
even in the context of public employees, 146 litigation pertaining to
social media in the workplace has become increasingly common
manner. 147
and courts have not decided these cases in a uniform
IV. CONNICK AND PICKERING: THE UNPREDICTABILITY IN

THE SOCIAL MEDIA WORLD
Courts have sent mixed messages regarding how to satisfy
not only the Pickering-Connickbalancing test but also the public
8
Just as some
concern requirement articulated in Connick.14
courts, in deciding cases pertaining to public employees' First
Amendment rights, have decided in favor of the employee, others
1 49
Accordingly, it
have refrained from protecting the employee.
Bland, 730 F.3d at 386 (comparing a Facebook "like" of this sort to
the act of "displaying a political sign in one's front yard, which the Supreme
Court has held is substantive speech").
144

145 Id.

146 id.

Alicia D. Sklan, @socialmedia:Speech with a Click of a Button? #Social&SharingButtons,32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 377, 399 (2013).
148 Watt Lesley Black, Jr., When Teachers Go Viral: BalancingInstitutional Efficacy Against the FirstAmendment Rights of Public Educators in the
Age ofFacebook, 82 Mo. L. REV. 51, 57-58 (2017).
149 Compare Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 412 (4th Cir.
147

2016) (holding that the public concern requirement was satisfied), with Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App'x 817, 818-20 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that
the Pickering-Connickbalancing test was not properly satisfied).
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seems that while courts have taken some steps in the "development of First Amendment jurisprudence" in light of the internet
and social media revolution, 150 the applicability of speech right
protections to public employees remains unclear and unsettled. 1
A. Court'sRuling in Favor of the Employee
In Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't., the Second Circuit
held that a statement pertaining to racial discrimination in the
workplace was, in fact, a matter of public concern regardless of
the employee's motive for making the statement.' 52 The Court's
reasoning for its decision, was that holding otherwise would adopt
a policy that allows employers to easily infringe on the First
Amendment rights of their employees by stating that because the
employee made a statement of public concern for personal 153
reaconcern.
public
of
matter
a
se,
per
not,
was
sons, the statement
Similarly, in Liverman v. City of Petersburg,the Court also
found that the public concern requirement was met.1 54 In Liverman, two police officers, while off-duty, were originally found to
have violated the department's social media policy by posting

150

See Rafic H. Barrage, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: First

Amendment Free Speech GuaranteeExtended to the Internet,49 MERCER L.
REv. 625, 639 (1998).
151 See id.
152 See Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Second Circuit in Garcia determined that the U.S. District Court in Connecticut incorrectly held that Garcia's speech was not protected by the First
Amendment. Id. Garcia, a police officer, spoke at a press conference about the
alleged discrimination he experienced within the police department. Id. Garcia's speech at the press conference had a dual purpose of also protecting his
reputation in light of the discrimination. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit on appeal
ultimately held that regardless of Garcia's motive for speaking at the press conference, he nonetheless spoke about a matter of public concern, specifically
whether the police department discriminated against Hispanics. Id. Garcia
stands for the notion that speech regarding apublic concern will be protected
regardless of the speaker's subjective motive for making the speech.
153 Id.
154 Liverman, 844 F.3d at 409-410.
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comments on Facebook regarding the promotion policies for its
officers. 155
In reversing the District Court's holding, the Fourth Circuit
reiterated the legal framework applied by courts throughout the
years, after it was originally established in Pickering,namely that
"[p]ublic employees may not 'be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest.' ' ' 156 Yet, arguably paradoxically, the Court also reiterated what the Supreme Court stated
'must accept certain limitations
in Garcetti: "[a] public [employee]
157
freedom.'
her
or
his
on
In reconciling the broad social media policy at issue with
the Pickering-Connickbalancing test the Court explained,
Indeed, the particular attributes of social media fit
comfortably within the existing balancing inquiry:
A social media platform amplifies the distribution
of the speaker's message - which favors the employee's free speech interests - but also increases
the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental disruption, thereby favoring the employer's interest in efficacy. What matters to the
First Amendment analysis is not only the medium
but the scope and content of the reof the speech,
158
striction.
Id. at 407 (finding that the police department's social media policy
was overly broad and infiinged on the officer's First Amendment freedom of
speech rights). Specifically, the officers were discussing through Facebook the
lenient promotion policy that the department had been following as of recently.
Id. at 405.
156Id. at 406 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568
(1968)). The Liverman Court noted that the policy reason behind this principle
was that public employees are the ones who usually tend to have "informed
opinions as to the operations of their public employers." Id. (quoting City of
San Diego
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004)).
15 7 Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
151 Id. at 407. Additionally, "the government 'must demonstrate that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."' Id. (quoting United States
v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)).
151
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The Court found that the police department's social media policy,
without a doubt, acted as a "virtual blanket prohibition" on the officers' speech criticizing its government employer and ultimately
the ofdecided that the department's social media policy restricted
159
ficers' rights to speak on matters of public concern.
In recognizing the important role that social media plays in
the workplace, while being cognizant of the dangers posed by such
communications the Court recognized,
We do not, of course, discount the capacity of social media to amplify expressions of rancor and vitriol, with all its potential disruption of workplace
relationships that Connick condemned. But social
networking sites like Facebook have also emerged
as a hub for sharing information and opinions with
one's larger community. And the speech prohibited
by the policy might affect the public interest in any
number of ways, including whether the Department
is enforcing the law in an effective and diligent
manner, or whether it is doing so in a way that is
just and evenhanded to all concerned. The Department's law enforcement policies could well become a matter of constructive public debate and dialogue between law enforcement officers and those
whose safety they are sworn to protect. But this
policy will cut short all of that. To repeat, it
squashes speech
on matters of public import at the
60
outset.'
very
159
'60

Liverman, 844 F.3d at 407.
Id. at 408. After the Court determined that the speech in question re-

lated to a matter of public concern, the Court next applied the PickeringConnick balancing test and held that the department did not demonstrate that the
Facebook comments here disrupted its mission. Id. Instead, the department
merely made general and speculative allegations which were insufficient to
show that the police department's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs" outweighed the officers' interest, as public employees, in engaging in such social media conversation. Id. at 407 (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983)).
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In sum, while courts such as the ones mentioned above,
have ruled in favor of the employee, other courts have sent "mixed
perhaps other circuit
messages" relating to similar issues that
1 61
differently.
interpreted
have
would
courts
B. Court's Ruling in Favor of the Employer
Contrary to the section above, 162 other circuit courts have
163
found the speech at issue to not be a matter of public concern.
In Graziosi v. City of Greenville Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit upheld a police chief's decision to terminate one of its police officers
after she made several comments while she was off-duty, on her
Facebook page, and on the Mayor's Facebook page, criticizing the
to a fellow officer's fuchief for failing to send a representative
1' 64
duty.
of
line
the
in
killed
was
who
neral
Here, the lower court held, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
that Graziosi did not speak as a private citizen on a matter of public concern so, the First Amendment did not protect her and the
police department had every right to fire her.165 Yet again, another

161

162
163

See Allred, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.A.
See, e.g., Graziosi v. City of Greenville Miss., 775 F.3d 731, 737-38

(5th Cir. 2015); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App'x 817, 819 (11th Cir.

2013).
164 Graziosi,775 F.3d at 734-35. After Graziosi posted the statement on
her Facebook page, several of her Facebook friends "liked" the post and left
comments which Graziosi replied to. Id. at 734.
165 Id. at 735, 741. Specifically, the lower court determined that Graziosi
identified herself as a member of the Greenville Police Department, and spoke
in her official capacity, rather than as a private citizen, by using words in her
Facebook post like "we" and "our." Id. Additionally, the District Court held
that Graziosi did not speak on a matter of public concern because her speech
related to an internal departmental decision. Id. Further, the District Court
found that even assuming that Graziosi did speak as a citizen on a matter of
public concern, she would have nonetheless failed the Pickering-Connickbalancing test because there was evidence that her post caused disruption within
the police department. Id. Thus, when weighing her interests in making such
speech with the department's interests in "maintaining discipline and good
working relationships within the department," the disruption that her speech
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circuit court recognized that the "Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected the notion that public employees forfeit their'1 rights
to
66
employment."
public
their
of
virtue
by
speech
of
freedom
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Graziosi's first argument namely, that her speech was in fact made as a private citizen and not pursuant to her official job duties.1 67 Contrary to the
reason why the District Court held that Graziosi's statements were
not made as a private citizen, the Fifth Circuit found that identification by the public employee, like Graziosi did here by using
words such as "we" and "our" to insinuate that she worked for the
police department, is actually welcomed because "public employees . . . 'occupy trusted positions in society,' . . . and are 'the

members of a community most likely to have informed
and defi' 16 8
community.
the
to
import
of
matters
on
nite opinions'
The Court disagreed with Graziosi's second argument on
69
appeal, namely that she spoke on a matter of public concern.'
Specifically, Graziosi argued that she satisfied the public concern
requirement because her Facebook post concerned budgetary issues and thus was a legitimate concern for the community. 170 The
Fifth Circuit's basis rested upon the fact that Graziosi's speech
was motivated based on her own frustration that the Chief did not
caused outweighed any possible interest that Graziosi had in speaking on such a
matter. Id. at 741.
166 Graziosi,775 F.3d at 736 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968)).
167 Id. at 737. The Court used the Supreme Court's decision in Lane v.
Franksto reject the District Court's decision in Garcetti. Id. Specifically, the
Court held that Graziosi had not spoken as a private citizen because, by using
words such as "we" and "our," she had insinuated that she was employed as a
police officer. Id.; see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (finding that the plaintiff's statement was made as a private citizen and, that contrary
to the Eleventh Circuit's holding, making a job-related sworn judicial statement
alone does not automatically define the speech as one made pursuant to one's
official 'ob duties).
1 8 Graziosi, 775 F.3d at 737 (first quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S.
410, 419 (2006); then quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968)).
169 Id. at 737-38.
170 Id. at 738. (stating that the budget issues in question include whether a
police representative should have been sent to attend the funeral of a fellow police officer of the department using the city's funds).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

27

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:2

send a police representative to the officer's funeral, rather than to
expose any issues that would be public in nature. 171 Based on the
"departmental buzz" that ensued after Graziosi's Facebook post,
the Court ultimately held that the police department had a "subclose working relastantial interest[] in maintaining discipline 1and
72
tionships and preventing insubordination.'

Gresham v. City of Atlanta, is another case where a circuit
court held that the "Facebook-firing" of a public employee was
constitutional because the employer did not violate the employees'
First Amendment rights.' 73 One of the main issues in Gresham,
when the Court was determining whether Gresham's Facebook
post was a matter of public concern, was that Gresham had her Facebook page set to private.1 74 Despite the fact that several of
Gresham's Facebook friends could view the post, share it and "potentially distribute the comment more broadly," the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court and held that because Greshtrying to notify the
am's Facebook was set to private she was not
175
concern.
public
of
issue
an
public and create
Graziosi, 775 F.3d at 739 (holding that "we cannot allow the 'mere insertion of a scintilla of speech regarding a matter of public concern,' ... to
'plant the seed of a constitutional case."' (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 149 (1983)).
172 Id. at 741 (finding that preventing disruptions that could jeopardize an
employer's interest in maintaining discipline and close working relationships is
an acceptable reason for justifying a public employee's termination).
173 See Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App'x 817, 819-20 (11th Cir.
2013). Here Gresham, a police officer made a Facebook post criticizing a fellow officer for "interfering in an unethical manner" with the investigation of
someone whom Gresham had arrested for "fraud and financial identity theft."
Id. at 818. After the department discovered Gresham's Facebook post, it
opened an investigation to determine whether Gresham had violated a department policy which stated "that any criticism of a fellow officer 'be directed only
through official Department channels, to correct any deficiency, and.., not be
used to the disadvantage of the reputation or operation of the Department or any
employees."' Id. During the pendency of the investigation, the department
failed to promote Gresham to certain positions he would have been eligible for.
Id. For these reasons, Gresham sued arguing that the department passed her
over forpromotion in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. Id.
17 See id. at 818.
171Id. at 819.
171

[T]he context of [Gresham's] speech is not one calculated to
bring an issue of public concern to the attention of persons
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In sum, "Facebook has single-handedly destroyed the
meaning of numerous words in our lexicon, including "like,"
"friend" and-as illustrated by this case and many others"private."1 76 If Gresham's Facebook page would not have been
private, it is likely that the Court would have found the post to relate to a matter of public concern. 177 In such a scenario, a court
probably would not have thought that she was merely "venting her
frustration" with her own circle of Facebook friends only because
in such a case Gresham would have been bringing the matter to the
public's attention in hopes to, not only bring the issue to the surface and known to someone with authority who could resolve it,
178
but to also "generate pressure for such changes."
However, if Gresham had raised the argument that the police department should never have seen her post since her page
was private, and therefore should never have suffered an adverse
employment action, would the court have accepted this argument? 79 While the answer to this is unclear, there is one thing
that appears to be well-established: despite the application of First
Amendment "rights," in the internet0 world, public employees are
18
better off not ranting on Facebook.
C. The DistinctInterests of the Employer
Approximately one year after Gresham, another court considered a police officer's First Amendment speech rights to post
with authority to make corrections, nor was its context one of
bringing the matter to the attention of the public to prompt
public discussion to generate pressure for such changes. Rather,... the context was more nearly one of [Gresham] venting her frustrations with her superiors.
Id.

Venkat Balasubramani, Police Officer's Facebook Venting Isn't Protected By The FirstAmendment - Gresham v. Atlanta, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/10/police-officersfacebook-venting-isnt-protected-by-the-first-amendment-gresham-vatlanta.htm.
171See Gresham, 542 F. App'x at 819-20.
176

178
id.

179Balasubramani, supra note
180 Balasubramani, supra note 176.
176.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

29

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:2

on Facebook. 181 In Duke v. Hamil, the District Court ruled in favor of the police department and found that it properly demoted a
police captain who posted a picture of a Confederate flag on his
Facebook page along182with a politically charged statement about a
"second revolution."'
Although the case did not clearly mention
whether or not Duke's Facebook page was set to private, it appears
the page was private because the Court noted that "Plaintiff intended only those with direct access183to his page, such as close
friends and family, to view the post."'
The court focused on two inquiries: (1) whether the "plaintiff spoke as a citizen, and (2) whether ...[the] speech was a mat-

ter of public concern."'1 84 In regard to the first question, the Court
held that the plaintiff had spoken as a citizen and not pursuant to
his official job duties.1 85 On the second inquiry, the Court again
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and decided that the Facebook post at
issue related to a matter of public concern.86
It went downhill for the plaintiff, however, when the Court
began to apply the Pickering-Connickbalancing test to determine
181
182

Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
Id. at 1293, 1303 (noting that the statement plaintiff posted on his Fa-

cebook page, along with the image of the Confederate flag, was made soon after
the 2012 presidential election and stated, "[i]t's time for the second revolution").
183 Id. at 1293-94 (finding that although plaintiff removed the post within
one hour after posting it, it was too late because someone had already seen it
and provided an Atlanta television station with a picture of the post).
184

Id. at 1299.

Id. at 1300 ("Here, Plaintiff posted the image and statement on his
personal Facebook page, which did not identify his employment with the CSU
Police Department. Nor did the statement refer to any of the Department's policies, practices, or employees. There is thus no indication that Plaintiff spoke
pursuant to his official duties in any way. As a result, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff spoke as a citizen, not as an employee of the CSU Police Department.").
186Duke, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. ("[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff's
speech can be fairly considered to relate to matters of political concern to the
community because a Confederate flag can communicate an array of messages,
among them various political or historical points of view. Combine this symbol
with a statement calling for a revolution right after an election, and it is plausible that Plaintiff was expressing his dissatisfaction with Washington politicians.").
185
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if plaintiffs interest in speaking on such a matter of public concern outweighed the police department's interest in running an efficient public service. 187 The Court did not accept plaintiffs argument that he had not caused any disruption to the police
department in making the post at issue. 188 In fact, in holding that
the police department's interest in maintaining an efficient public
service outweighed any interest possessed by the plaintiff, the
Court stated that a lack of specific evidence showing workplace
18 9
disruption was not fatal to the police department's position.
The Court engaged in a balancing test under Pickering,
where the main concern was a foreseeable negative impact on the
"discipline, mutual respect, or trust" among those who Duke supervised. 190 This speculative analysis by the Court is at the heart
of what makes the Pickering balancing test so troubling. 19 1 According to the Court, the "public attention the speech received also
92
implicated the Department's reputation and the public's trust."',
Although Duke attempted to argue that any impact on reputation
19 3
was mere speculation, the Court unfortunately did not agree.
187Duke, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
Id. at 1301 ("After all, while the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff intended to express his disapproval of Washington politicians, on its face his
speech could convey a drastically different message with different implications.
Many of these messages are controversial, divisive, and prejudicial to say the
least. Because these potentially offensive messages came from the Department's second-in-command, Hamil did not have to wait to see if the controversy
affected the discipline, mutual respect, or trust among the officers Plaintiff supervised before addressing it.").
8
9Id.at 1301-02 (holding that due to the supervisory role held by the
plaintiff, the speech at issue here "could undermine 'loyalty, [and] good working relationships among the [Department's] employees if left unaddressed.").
190
Id. at 1301.
191 Id. (the Court makes it clear that any departmental "disruption" caused
by the employee's action is at the very least, mere speculation and need not be
proven).
192
Duke,997 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
193
In dismissing Plaintiff's speculation argument, the Court explained
that as Deputy Chief of Police, Plaintiff's position in the department significantly reflected on the Department's reputation more than the conduct of other officers in the Department. Id. Indeed, again quite speculatively, the Court noted
that the community would also be offended by the "chosen form of speech." Id.
Further, without showing current evidence of such, the Court noted that the
188
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Even without showing any current tangible evidence of harm or
even reputational harm, according to the Court, the analysis came
down to the fact that "the speech at issue was capable of impeding
' 94
the government's ability to perform its duties efficiently."'
The Court acknowledged that social media speech is often
unclear. 195 In recognizing the difficulty of applying the Pickering
analysis, particularly when an employee's expression of political
views is at the zenith of First Amendment protections, the Court
explained that it:
Recognizes Plaintiffs interest in expressing his political views, especially during an election season.
Indeed, political speech "is the essence of selfgovernment," and it "occupies the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." But the politically
charged context also heightens the potential for
Plaintiffs particular speech to damage the Department's interests. Appearing to advocate revolution
during a presidential election, and to associate that
idea with a Confederate flag, Plaintiff likely sent a
partisan, if not prejudicial, message to many in the
Department and the community it
CSU Police
6
19

serves.

Notwithstanding some of the underlying issues of applying the
balancing test, the distinct interests of a public employer in maintaining an efficient workplace atmosphere and steering clear from
public views, remains the focal point of this subject matnegative
19 7
ter.
For example, in her opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, Justice O'Connor explained that due to close
speech at question could also "undermine confidence in the Department." Id.
(emphasis added).
194 Id.
195 See id. ("Plaintiffs intent may not have been to convey an offensive
message, but his chosen manner of speech left ample room for interpretation.").
196 See Duke, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03 (citations omitted).
197 Id. at 1303.
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relationship between a public employee and a public employer,
"[t]he government needs to be free to terminate both employees
and contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency,
efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption."'1 98 While momentarily putting
the employee's interest to the side, the Court in Waters v. Churchill did make a valid point:
The government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated
from a relatively subordinate interest .... The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at
large just in the name of efficiency. But where the
government is employing someone for the very
purpose of effectively achieving its
goals, such re1 99
appropriate.'
be
well
may
strictions
Thus, an employer's significant interest in efficiency cannot be ignored. However, these interests must be reconciled with an employee's interests in light of prevailing concerns that are likely to
arise.
V. EMons: THE GOOD (D AND THE BAD
The smiley face, the wink, the frowning face, the eyerolling face, nails being Fainted, fire, and an eggplant are just
some examples of emojis. 0o Emojis can be described as modem
hieroglyphics. 20 1 These cartoon-like faces and images are part of
our daily language in the "digital age" and are used as a way to
express ideas and opinions. 2 02 Emojis are used to convey emotions in a way that words cannot; emojis can "add context, clarify
meaning, or even completely transform a sentence by turning what
198 Bd. of Cty. Comni'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674
199 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994).
2
00 See John G. Browning & Gwendolyn Seale, MORE

(1996).
THAN WORDS

The Evidentiary Value of Emoji, 57 No. 10 DRI FOR DEF. 34 (2015).
201

Id.

202 id.
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initially appeared to be a serious statement into a joke simply b
adding a winking or smiling face to indicate sarcasm or joking.
Because the use of emojis is critical to understanding a
conversation in its entirety, they can have significant evidentiary
value. 20 4 Understanding
• the meaning
205 the emoji user. intended to
Was the emoji intended to
convey, however, is not always easy.
[emoji]
express a false statement or does adding the "'smiley face'
intent?" 206
... at the end of a message indicate a humorous
A. The Slippery Slope of Interpretation
As the saying goes, "[a] picture is worth a thousand
words. 2 0 7 Using emojis may be fun, however, "humor can cloud
even a superstar employee's judgment., 20 8 While communicating
with emojis may seem "fun and harmless," the bottom line is that
communication with the use of emojis "[has] more of a tendency
to convey inappropriate content." 209 Take for example, the use of
an eggplant emoji that is frequently used to refer to male genitalia
in modem day slang conversations, despite its conventional definition of being a large egg-shaped fruit. 2 1° The true meaning intended to be conveyed with an emoji is particularly difficult to deci211
pher perhaps because their meanings are highly subjective.
Browning & Seale, supra note 200.

203
204 id.
205

See EMOJI-GOSH!How Emojis in Workplace Communications Can

Spark Lawsuit (Or Make It Harder To Defend One), NAT'L L. REV. (Nov. 20,
2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/emoji-gosh-how-emojisworkplace-communications-can-spark-lawsuit-or-make-it-harder.
206 Browning & Seale, supra note 200.
207 See Tanya M. Kiatkulpiboone & Andrea W. Paris, Emoji and Deciphering Intent in the DigitalAge, 59 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 42, 46 (2017).
08NAT'L L. REv., supra note
NAT'L L. REv., supra note

209
210

205.
205.
Amanda Hess, Move Over, Banana, SLATE (Apr. 3, 2015, 2:20 PM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/04/eggplant-rising-how_t
banana as the most-phallic.html.
he..purple-fruitsurpassedjthe
211
As Hess recognized,
[E]moticons for a winky face ";-)" and that for a stuck-out
tongue ":-P" are trickier to interpret than the standard smile or
frown.... The wink and the tongue are often used to denote
teasing or flirting, and interpreting the subtext of those activi-
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As courts recently discovered, however, the true meaning
of these emojis really does matter.21 2 In 2013, a court for the first
time recognized that certain nonverbal social media conduct was
in fact a statement protected by the First Amendment.213 Not long
after, the Supreme Court considered whether the Facebook posts
of a man who was threatening his wife were entitled to First
Amendment protections when the husband claimed that the posts
were meant as a joke as evidenced by the use of a smiley face
emoji sticking its tongue out.2 14 Although the Court did not consider the First Amendment issues presented by the case, it is important to note that the Court's decision to reverse Elonis' convic2 15
tion was based on the intent behind his Facebook post.
Varying interpretations of the meaning of the same emoji,
however, are inevitable. 216 In a 2014 defamation proceeding, a
judge from the Court of Appeals of Michigan determined that the
emoji face of a stuck out tongue at the end of an allegedly defamaties requires the reader to understand the power dynamics between texter and recipient. Depending on the context, the
emoticons can read as either creepy or cute.
See Amanda Hess, Exhibit A: ;-), SLATE (Oct. 26, 2015, 4:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/1 0/emoticons and-emojis
_asevidence-in-court.html.
212 Id. ("Courts have always had to interpret
nonverbal cues, like shrugs
and winks, that arise in face-to-face conversations. But digital symbols are
something new.... So far, efforts to build a unified emotional context for hundreds of emojis used by millions of people around the world have failed.").
213 See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).
214 See Elonis v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008, 2012 (2015) (reversing the
conviction of Elonis, a Pennsylvania man who directed violent language against
his estranged wife on Facebook, without ruling on the First Amendment issue).
215 Id. at 2011. Chief Justice John Roberts Jr., writing for the majority,
stated the importance of deciphering Elonis' intention behind his Facebook post
due to criminal-law principles that governed. As such, proving that reasonable
people 216
would view the statements here as threats was not enough. Id.
See Fred Barbash, Sleepy face, sad face or shockedface: The emoji
identity crisis., THE WASHINGTON POST (June 12, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-nix/wp/2015/06/12/why-wecant-agree-what-emoji-mean/?utmterm=.a95bff8724f1 (pointing out that emoji's are "culturally and contextually bound" and "are a language - and languages evolve of their own accord"); see also Kiatkulpiboone & Paris, supra
note 207 ("A winking emoji or emoticon could result in similarly contradictory
interpretations.").
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tory statement made it clear that the statement was made as a
joke. 217 However, the following year, a U.S. District Court judge
in Michigan also ruled on an issue interpreting the meaning of this
same emoji, although in a different context, and in ruling against
the defendant, the judge determined that the use of the wide open
mouth smile emoji did not "materially alter the meaning of the text
message."218
Several scenarios can arise where interpreting the use of an
emoji is crucial. Consider one scenario: an employee files a complaint with her human resources department accusing one of her
co-workers of sexually harassing her.219 Through an exchange of
emails, a human resources employee responds to the complaint by
contacting the complainant's supervisor. 220 In the email exchange,
the supervisor responds by stating: "Are you kidding me? She
the end
complains about everything. Yeah I'll look into it" and atemoji.
22 1
painting
nail
a
includes
supervisor
the
sentence
the
of
The supervisor ends up failing to investigate and the complainant
quits a few weeks later; and subsequently filing a sexual harassment lawsuit. 222 One of the key evidentiary pieces in this lawsuit
will be the email exchange and the interpretation of the nail painton the decided interpretation, the
ing emoji. 22 3 Thus, depending
nail painting emoji may be considered as evidence that the com-

217

The majority determined,

The use of the ":P" emoticon makes it patently clear that the
commenter was making a joke. As noted earlier, a ":P" emoticon is used to represent a face with its tongue sticking out to
denote a joke or sarcasm. Thus, a reasonable reader could not
view the statement as defamatory.
Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d 128, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
218 Enjaian v. Schlissel, No. 14-CV-13297, 2015 WL 3408805, at *7 n.10
(E.D. Mich. May 27, 2015) (finding that the use of the emoji did not change the
of the text message).
meaning
2 19
NAT'L L. REV., supra note 205.
220 NAT'L L. REV., supra note 205.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. (noting that the nail painting emoji is often used as a way of saying
"I don't care").
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plainants supervisor
did not take the harassment or the investiga2 24
tion seriously.

However, what if the employee finds out about the email
exchange and decides to make a public Facebook post regarding
the treatment at work? She could attach the email to the post and
emphasize& the nail emoji as an indication that her supervisor remained indifferent to numerous sexual harassment complaints;
imagine, shortly thereafter, the employee is fired because her supervisor learned about the Facebook post. Will courts interpret the
employee's statement as a matter of public concern that is worthy
of protection?
Another difficulty in interpreting the true meaning of an
emoji emerged after Apple, in early 2015, decided to update their
225
emojis in an attempt to be more racially diverse and inclusive.
Apple's update allowed emoji users to select the skin color of certain emojis. 226 This update, however, creates further issues that

have not yet been explored by the courts.
Take for example, an officer who posts two emojis-a
black woman dancing and a flame---on a fellow officer's Facebook page in an attempt to root for the fellow officer who is running for sheriff. Does the officer's use of emojis constitute an underlying discriminatory motivation or did the officer post them
with harmless intent? Depending on the audience deciphering the
meaning, the interpretations will likely vary significantly. 227 For

224

NAT'L

225

Aimee Picchi, Why emoji in the workplace get afrownyface, CBS

L. REv., supra note 205.

(July 19, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.cetusnews.com/business/Whyemoji-in-the-workplace-get-a-frowny-face. SJIEWh2rb.html.
226 Keven Moore, An Emoji picture could be worth thousands of dollars
in risk exposure .)$.-)$, NORTHERN KENTUCKY TRIBUNE (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.nkytribune.com/2016/02/keven-moore-an-emoji-picture-could-beworth-thousands-of-dollars-in-risk-exposure/.
227 See fire emoji, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/meaning/fire-emoji (last visited May 14, 2019)
[hereinafterfire emoji] (explaining that the fire emoji also known as the 'flame,
hot or lit emoji" can be used to signify that someone or something is "cool or
great" or can "evoke the idiom 'to be on fire"'); see also Jennifer Jolly, A guide
to all those weird words your teen uses, USA TODAY (Mar. 3, 2017, 1:39 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/colurmist/2017/03/03/guide-all-thoseNEWS
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example, a younger audience or one who is accustomed to modem
slang, may interpret the fire emoji next to the dancing black woman emoji to mean that it's "awesome" that there is a black person
running for the sheriffs position.228 Others might interpret it to
mean that the candidate is attractive.22 9 Some, however, may interpret the pair of emojis negatively and take them to mean that the
officer hates the candidate and is a symbol implying that the candidate should die in a fire or even that the officer plans on, quite
literally, setting the candidate on fire.23°
Here is where the trouble begins: assume that the Facebook
post only caused a small number of people from the community to
comment but did not cause an immense outcry from the public.
Yet, after seeing the post, the Chief decided to fire the officer primarily due to political disagreement with the officer's political beliefs. In other words, the Chief merely used the officer's Facebook post as an excuse for terminating the officer even though the
public had not demanded that the officer be fired nor were the duties of other officers affected by the post. Subsequently, the employee filed a lawsuit alleging that the police department violated
his First Amendment rights by terminating him because of his Facebook post.
Assume that the court found the post to be a statement of
public concern because of its political nature but agreed with the
police department's position that it had a strong interest in running
an efficient workplace; thus, the department's interests outweighed
those of the employee. As a result, even though there was no evidence of any actual disruption that was caused by the employee's
Facebook post, the court ruled in favor of the police department.
Furthermore, the court's decision rested on the agreement with the
department's argument that, while there had not been any harm
weird-words-your-teen-uses/98688930/ (defining "lit" as something that is "hot
and hagening").
2 See fire emoji, supra note 227.
229 See id. (stating that the fire emoji can also be used to express that
someone is "sexy" or "really good looking" and does not only apply to a significant other but can also apply to celebrities).
230 Seefire emoji, supra note 227 (explaining that some people may interpret the fire emoji, paired with other emojis, to have a negative meaning and
read the emoji to literally symbolize fire).
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caused by the officer's post, possible disruption was nonetheless
possible if there had been an outcry from the public fearing that
the officer was going to cause harm to black citizens. Even
though the officer did not post the fire emoji on Facebook with illwill, instead merely meaning it as a symbol of support, does the
court's decision to rely primarily on the interests of the police department make sense?
Even though the above scenario was fabricated, it nonetheless illustrates possible issues that could arise in the near future as
courts begin to confront emoji issues in litigation. In light of these
new forms of communication and the different meanings that
could attach to the use of an emoji, despite the user's actual intentions, the current framework that determines whether a public employee's speech warrants First Amendment protection must be
reevaluated. 231 Even if the exact message is unclear, courts have
decided that the message does not need to be "a narrow, succinctly
articulable message" in order to receive constitutional protection. 232 As the rights of public employees continue to be pushed
aside, courts will likely see an increase in litigation relating to
online communication and the use of emojis. 2 33 After all, emojis
are the new language of today and, "love
them or hate them, [they]
234
are not going anywhere anytime soon.,
B. Striking a Balance
As previously discussed, the widespread use of emojis has
caused employers and courts alike to wrestle with the true meanSee generally Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (recognizing that an employee's intent combined with the many controversial interpretations of a symbol can leave "ample room for interpretation"
and further noting the importance of safeguarding political speech).
232 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp.
of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
233 Genevieve Douglas & Jay-Anne B. Casuga, A Double-Edged
Smiley?
Emojis in Employment Suits Cut Both Ways, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://bna.com/doubleedged-smiley-emojis-n57982091439/.
214 E.J. Schultz & Jessica Wohl, PepsiPreps Global Emoji Can and
Bottle Campaign,AD-AGE (Feb. 19, 2016), http://adage.com/article/cmostrategy/pepsi-preps-global-emoji-bottle-campaign/302748/.
231
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ing and intentions behind the use of an emoji. 23 5 Deciphering the

meaning of emojis used in a conversation is already difficult as it
is. 2 36 Using the current framework's balancing test to determine
whether an employee's emoji speech is protected does not make
this already troubling inquiry simpler.237 In fact, the current balancing test raises additional questions, such as whether this test infringes on 8an employee's rights instead of actually "balancing"
anything.

23

236

See supranotes 207-13 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 200-06 and accompanying text.

237

As Black indeed recognized,

235

The pace of advances in communication technology and the
lack of clear Supreme Court precedent make it difficult for
[public employers] to walk that fine line [of respecting First
Amendment rights of employees while still responding to employer's concern of maintaining an efficient workplace]. Not
only is it confusing to [public employers], but [public employees] also lack clarity about what is and is not acceptable
in terms of online expressive conduct.
Black, Jr., supranote 148, at 86.
238 See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454,
482
(1985) ("Balancing is difficult to undertake unless one side of the scale is relatively insubstantial."); see also Andrew C. Alter, Public Employees' Free
Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers Upsets the Delicate PickeringBalance, 13
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 182, 195 (1984) (stating that the Pickering
balancing test does not adequately protect the First Amendment rights of public
employees because the balancing test is "capricious" and places an "unreasonably heavy burden [on] employees"); Volokh stated,
[B]alancing is not an answer; it's just a way of reframing the
question. Balancing sounds manageable because the metaphor conjures up a familiar real-life device: a balance scale
used for weighing two physical objects. The balance scale,
though, works only because it uses a reliable physical process
that unerringly compares a single, easily commensurable, attribute of two items. No physical device can tell us whether
some lump of government interest "weighs" more-is of
greater "constitutional gravity"-than some clunk of free
speech right. The statement "courts should balance" thus
simply invites the question "How?"
Referring the matter to one's unarticulated intuitions-the
scale in each judge's conscience-is, even if legitimate, simply impractical. "Trust your instincts" is not a useful legal rule
in such a system, especially (as the Court has repeatedly held)
in free speech cases.
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As recognized by many, "[b]alancing tests, by their very
nature, come with a level of uncertainty in application. '' 219 Indeed,
a balancing test often leaves both employees and employers blind240
to guide their behavior.,
sided without "predictable
.. standards
...
241
Further, applying the Pickering-Connickbalancing test to inter-

net speech, makes matters increasingly difficult. 24 2 This application often leads to "uncertain predictions" about whether or not the
speech in question is protected under the First Amendment.2 4 3
Proponents of the Pickering-Connickbalancing test in these
cases will likely argue that its preservation is critical to ensure that
the efficiency of a government employer's workplace is maintained especially where the supervisory role of an employee can
cause a massive disruption in the workplace. Undoubtedly, public
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending
Balancing, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 141, 167-68 [hereinafter Volokh on Speech
Rights and Balancing Tests].
239
Lindsay A. Hitz, ProtectingBlogging: The Needfor an Actual Disruption Standardin Pickering, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1151, 1191 (2010). Further noting that the fear underlying the uncertainties of the Pickeringbalancing
test has led to an "unnecessary chilling of electronic speech by public employees" and "tightening" of the current standard is necessary in order to "more adequately protect the process necessary for a free marketplace of ideas." Id. at
1185-86.
240 Alter, supra note 238, at 191 (indicating the importance of uniform
guidelines).
241 See supra notes 40-47, 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing
the
Pickering-Connickbalancing test).
242 Emily McNee, Disruptingthe PickeringBalance: FirstAmendment
Protectionsfor Teachers in the DigitalAge, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1818, 1835
(2013).
243 Id. McNee asserts that:
The nature of online speech on social networking websites
like Facebook presents novel concerns in First Amendment
Law. As [public employers] seek to regulate employee
this is an area of the law that needs to be adspeech ....
dressed. The standard for determining whether speech will be
protected under the First Amendment is unclear, and even
more ambiguous when applied to Facebook speech. [Public
employees] need consistency and certainty if they are to
freely engage in speech that addresses matters of public concern. In order to avoid a chilling effect on [public employee's
rights], the Pickeringstandard must be reconsidered.
Id. at 1853.
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employers are "caught in a difficult position when one of their
employees engages in controversial speech that goes viral," however, "they must respect [and be cognizant of] the First Amendment rights of their employees." 2 4
The application of the Pickering-Connickbalancing test often turns a complete blind-eye to public employee's rights.24 5 As a

result, a public employee's speech can often times be unduly suppressed without a strong justification. 246 As the Supreme Court
once stated, "[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech.... Men feared witches and burnt women....

To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is pracground24to
7
ticed."
The balancing test's underlying concern for the employer's
reputation, its ability to run the operation smoothly, and protecting
the public's trust has, in many cases, trumped an employee's First
Amendment rights. 248 But, is protecting an employer's reputation
worth trampling over civil liberties? Justice Black, a fervent opponent of balancing tests, would likely argue in support of the employee. 249 In arguing against such balancing tests, Justice Black
unequivocally resorted to the plain text of the First Amendment to
244 Black, Jr., supra note 148, at 85-86.
245 See Randy J. Kozel, ReconceptualizingPublic Employee Speech, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2005) ("By allowing disruption to justify employer
restrictions on speech, the Pickering test fails to afford employee speech any
real protection. All speech is theoretically punishable, provided that the speech
leads to a disruption large enough to outweigh the speech's perceived value.").
246 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475
(1995) ("[A] 'reasonable' burden on expression requires a justification far
stronger than mere speculation about serious harms.").
247 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S.
357, 376 (1927)).
248 See Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
(finding that because the employee's speech at issue here threatened the police
department's "reputation and the public's trust," it raised a major concem for
the department and therefore warranted protection over the right of the employee to engage in such speech).
249 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J.
dissenting) ("I do not subscribe to the doctrine that permits constitutionally pro).
tected rights to be 'balanced' away ....
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support his position.2 5 ° Stripping a public employee of his or her
right to speech, simply because it may be "expedient" to do so,
25 1
turns the foundational beliefs of our country upside down.
While a public employer does have a significant interest in
the smooth operation of its office, the difficulty in interpreting
new forms of social media speech is likely going to create a
whirlwind of public employee litigation in this area if the proper
balance is not found. Otherwise, due to the extensive population
reached through social media and the pervasiveness of internet
communications, a public employer will be able to easily argue
that the social media post in question, contributed to the inefficient
atmosphere due to the astounding total views of the posts and the
comments that ensued.
While an employer does have a distinct interest in protecting its workplace atmosphere and ensuring that its operations run
smoothly, it is troubling that an employee's speech rights can be
easily infringed upon without showing current tangible evidence
of harm.2 5 2 The rights guaranteed to a public employee, however,
cannot be so easily ignored.2 53 The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated:
That the Government's asserted interests are important in the abstract does not mean, however, that
the must-carry rules will in fact advance those interests. When the Government defends a regulation
on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply
250

See id. (noting that the First Amendment's command against abridg-

ing free speech, clearly shows the drafters' intent to prevent such balancing
from occurring and that they in fact "did all the 'balancing"' that would be

needed).
251

See id. at 68 ("[T]he 'balancing test' turns our 'Government of the

People, by the people and for the people' into a government over the people.").
252 See Duke, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (indicating that an employee's
speech that was merely capable of causing some harm could impede the efficiency of the workplace and thus, an employer did not have to provide current
tangible evidence of such harm) (emphasis added).
253 Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35
(1992) ("Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.").
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"posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured." It must demonstrate that the recited harms
are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulaalleviate these harms in a direct and
tion will in fact
254
way.
material
Engaging in speech can lead to controversial discussions.255 These
controversial discussions, and the disputes they invite, are supposed to be welcome under our system of government as a "function of free speech., 256 Accordingly, this is why freedom of
speech is "protected against censorship or punishment." 257 Perhaps one of the most important facts to keep in mind before agreeing with proponents of the Pickering-Connickbalancing test is that
the chief distinctions that sets us
freedom of speech is "one of 258
regimes.
totalitarian
apart from
VI. RECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Due to the popularity of the digital era, the evolution of
modem-day communication, and the difficulty in interpreting this
speech, protecting and preserving a public employee's civil liberties needs to be at the forefront of employment law discussions.
254

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (citation

omitted).
See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) (stating that speech
can often be "provocative and-challenging"). "[Speech] may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acof an idea." Id.
ceptance
256
Id. ("[T]he function of free speech] may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."). The Court also makes clear
that the "vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion" because only through engaging in a "free exchange of ideas" does
the government "remain[] responsive to the will of the people" and effect
"peaceful change." Id.
257
Id.(noting that this freedom is not absolute). The Court clarifies the
extent to which an employee's freedom of speech is protected and states that
protection is necessary "unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
25 8 or unrest." Id.
Id.at 29.
255
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When these rights are abandoned, the vulnerable become more
vulnerable and the powerless become more powerless. 25 9 Preliminary questions of fact should be entirely restricted to judicial inquiry.
Furthermore, this Note also suggests that the balancing
test currently used to weigh the competing interests at issue,
should be replaced with an alternative test, thereby, minimizing
the impact on the civil liberty concerns previously discussed in
this Note.261
A. Overview of the CurrentFrameworkand its Application
to Modern Forms of Speech
While courts have yet to apply current First Amendment
framework to a case involving a public employee's use of an emoji, an analysis of prior Supreme Court cases demonstrates that relying on current precedent could be troubling. The first issue that
courts will have to wrestle with, will likely be a question of fact
regarding the emoji at issue. 262 An important inquiry at this step,
will be whether the emoji satisfies the public concern test articulated by the Court in Connick.26 3 Determining that the emoji addresses a matter of public concern, which the employee will need
to establish as a prerequisite to validly assert a First Amendment
violation, will be difficult due to the varying interpretations of
2 64
emojis.
To resolve this factual dispute, courts will likely look to the
troubling precedent set in Waters, where the Court found that the
Connick test should be applied to what the employer reasonably
believes the employee said.265 In the event that a court does not
find the employer's version of the facts to be reasonable and also
finds that the speech at issue was indeed a matter of public concern, the First Amendment concerns remain powerfully alive. The
court would then use the Pickering-Connickbalancing test to de259
260
261
262
263
264
265

See, e.g., supra Sections II.A., II.B., II.C., ll.D.
See infra Section VI.B.
See supra notes 225-237 and accompanying text.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Sections II.A., II.B.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section II.D.
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termine whose interest, the employers or the employees, is worthi266
As previously discussed, this balancing test is
er of protection.
essentially the final straw, destroying any remnants of a public
employee's purported First Amendment rights.2 6 7 Accordingly, as
set forth below, courts should consider applying a different standa public employee's use of contemporary
ard in cases involving
2 8
speech.
media
social
B. Resolving FactualDisagreementsShould be a Judicial
Inquiry
Freedom of speech in the public sector, cannot be left to the
mercy of the employer. It is pragmatic to believe that employers,
in many cases, could fabricate a "reasonable belief' in order to satisfy the standard articulated in Waters.269 In an attempt to cloak
any discriminatory motivation, an employer could falsely justify
the adverse action taken against the employee.27 ° Due to the low
threshold required for an employer's belief to be deemed suffia court may accept the employer's proffered
ciently "reasonable,"
271
belief.
reasonable
The dangers that arise when an employer's reasonable belief is dispositive on the employee's First Amendment claim warrant a serious reconsideration of the "employer's reasonable beSee infra Sections H.A., Il.B.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
268 See infra Sections VI.B., VI.C.
269 See, e.g., infra Section II.D.
270 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1893) ("[W]e do not see
the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.").
266
267

271

Justice O'Connor stated:

Of course, there will often be situations in which reasonable
employers would disagree about who is to be believed, or
how much investigation needs to be done, or how much evidence is needed to come to a particular conclusion. In those
situations, many different courses of action will necessarily be
reasonable. Only procedures outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use may be condemned as unreasonable.
See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994).
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lief' test adopted by Waters.2 72 Instead of leaving the factual determinations up to the employer, who was the person responsible
for taking the adverse action in the first place, courts should prohibit the employer from having the ultimate say and allow only a
neutral fact finder to resolve factual disputes based on the totality
of the circumstances. 2 73 As Justice Stevens recognized,
The risk that a jury may ultimately view the facts
differently from even a conscientious employer is
not, as the plurality would have it, a needless fetter
on public employers' ability to discharge their duties. It is the normal means by which our legal system protects legal rights and encourages those in
authority to act with care.274
Thus, due to the current evolving digital era, the underlying
interpretation issues involved in new forms of technological communication, and the sanctity of an employee's rights, we cannot
afford to defer to an employer's decision and justify adverse action
on the basis of an employer's purported reasonable belief and the
Waters case should be overruled.

See Waters, 511 U.S at 676 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (admitting that
the reasonable belief test may erroneously punish protected speech); see also id.
at 698 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment assures public employees that they may express their views on issues of public concern without fear
of discipline or termination. .. ").
272

273

Justice Stevens noted:

A violation occurs when a public employee is fired for uttering speech on a matter of public concern that is not unduly
disruptive of the operations of the relevant agency. The violation does not vanish merely because the firing was based upon
a reasonable mistake about what the employee said. A First
Amendment claimant need not allege bad faith; the controlling question is not the regularity of the agency's investigative
procedures, or the purity of its motives, but whether the employee's freedom of speech has been "abridged."
See, e.g., id. at 698 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
i4id.
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C. Balancing Test Should Be Replaced with a Rebuttable
Presumption Test
In Connick, the Court dangerously announced a potential
disruption standard that required "full consideration of the government's interest" during the balancing test. 275 Despite admitting
that this inquiry proved to be difficult, the Court nonetheless began to consistently insinuate that only a mere possible disruption
standard was required.276 In fact, the Court's failure to articulate a
bright light rule regarding the necessary disruption required in
these lines of cases, led to the existence of conflicting disruption
standards when balancing competing interests.277
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the application of the balancing test in the context of a public employee's social media post containing an emoji, litigation regarding these new
forms of speech has begun to develop in lower courts. 7 ' Applying a potential disruption standard to new forms of expression,
such as emojis, would arguably, increase the likelihood that an
employee's First Amendment rights would be disregarded due to
the difficulty in ascertaining the true meaning of the expression
and the sender's intent.279
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-52 (1893) ("[W]e do not see
the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.").
276 See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 681 ("As a matter of law, this potential
disruptiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the
speech might have had."); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (noting the difficulty in conducting these potential disruption inquiries: "A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as
employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has
some potentialto affect the entity's operations") (emphasis added).
277 See, e.g., Lindsey v. City of Orrick, Mo., 491 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted) ("To trigger the Pickeringbalancing test, a public employer must, with specificity, demonstrate the speech at issue created workplace
disharmony, impeded the plaintiff's performance or impaired working relationships.").
278 See, e.g., Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d 128, 146 (Mich. Ct. App.
2014). The author of this Note acknowledges that the Court did not conduct an
analysis based on the Pickeringbalancing test.
275

279

See infra Section V.A.
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Thus, allowing employers to use such a broad standard
would likely render an employee's First Amendment violation
claims futile. In light of the increased popularity of social media
and unprecedented fact patterns, such as the use of emojis, courts
should abandon the Pickering balancing test and the intertwined
potential disruption test.28 ° Instead, courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption test applicable in cases involving new forms of
online speech, requiring an actual disruption to have occurred.
The rebuttable presumption, favoring the employee, would presume that the speech in question did not create any actual disruption. Unless proven otherwise by the employer, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, the employee is automatically entitled to
a judgment on the merits.
Applying this rebuttable presumption is a way to strike the
proper balance between an employer's distinct interests in the efficient operation and administration of its services and the competing constitutional interests of an employee. This new test would
not disregard the employer's interests but merely require an actual
showing of disruption before the court protects employer's stated
interests over that of the employee. After all, if a public employer's purported efficiency interests are not actually affected, why
should the court favor the employer's interests over the employee's constitutional rights that are actually being affected? In sum,
the proposals discussed above would likely prevent unnecessary
chilling of valuable forms of employee speech in the public sector.
VII. CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, predictability in the law is important. 28 1 As
the aforementioned discussion reveals, the lack of uniform guidelines in the current public employee free speech doctrine leads to
uncertainty in applying the law and forecloses on an employee's
ability to predict how the law will protect certain types of
2 80
281

See infra Section V.A.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Pathof the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.

991, 991 (1997) ("People want to know under what circumstances and how far
they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be

feared.").
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speech.282 The continuing expansion of electronic communication
as a vehicle for expression creates a pressand its useful purpose
283
change.
ing need for
Therefore, the Supreme Court should be proactive and consider the proposals above to reconstruct the current framework
used to determine whether a public employee's speech rights were
284
Reanalyzing the current legal framework in light of
violated.
new forms of expression that have emerged will avoid turning a
public employee's speech rights into an obsolete notion of the
past.285 We cannot silence public employee's while shielding an
employer from liability, as doing so will undoubtedly prejudice
public employees and entirely erode their rights, more so than
courts already have.
Thalia Olaya*

282

See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.

283

See Hitz, supra note 239, at 1183.

284
285

See infra Sections VI.B., VI.C.
Sabrina Niewialkouski, Is Social Media the New Era's "Water Cool-

er"? #NotIfYouAreAGovernmentEmployee, 70 U. MIAMI L. REv. 963, 997
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